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The volume we shall review here contains over thirty articles from vari-
ous authors, divided into three thematic sections: Cognition – Reasoning 
– Consciousness, Computation – Intelligence – Machine Learning, and Eth-
ics – Law. In this paper we shall focus on several articles selected from the 
book. However, some articles will not fully feature in the review, which is 
due to length limitations and for which I offer my apologies to the authors.
The fi rst section premieres with Artifi cial Consciousness: From Impos-
sibility to Multiplicity by Chuanfei Chin, in which the author analyses vari-
ous debates and viewpoints on artifi cial consciousness, as well as skepti-
cal arguments such as Chalmers’ Hard Problem and potential rebuttals to 
such arguments. The following four articles will be, with all due respect to 
their authors merely listed by titles: Cognition as Embodied Morphological 
Computation (Dodig-Crnkovic), “The Action of the Brain”: Machine Models 
and Adaptive functions in Turing and Ashby (Greif), An Epistemological 
Approach to the Symbol Grounding Problem (Guazzini), and An Enactive 
Theory of Need Satisfaction (Human et al.).
Next article that we will delve deeper into is David Longinotti’s Agency, 
Qualia and Life: Connecting Mind and Body Biologically, which presents a 
very interesting perspective on the Mind-Body Problem, claiming, against 
the Strong Artifi cial Intelligence thesis, that qualia are unique to biologi-
cal agents and may only be produced and explained by naturally occur-
ring neural networks. Furthermore, the article explains qualia as a form 
of energy, and functionally defi nes it as ‘control signals in the regulatory 
processes’.
How Are Robots’ Reasons for Actions Grounded? by Bryony Pierce over-
views different possible kinds of grounding to conclude that a non-con-
scious artifi cial agent’s actions can only ever be externally grounded in the 
affective responses of their users or creators, as consciousness is necessary 
for grounding. The author states that while a conscious robot would be 
capable of internal grounding, creation of such robot would not be morally 
permissible.
Anna Strasser’s paper Social Cognition and Artifi cial Agents takes cue 
in increasing presence of ever-smarter technology in our daily lives and 
thus human society. She follows a minimal approach to socio-cognitive abil-
ities, according to which artifi cial agents can be considered as having such 
abilities, in that they can – to a minimal extent – understand other social 
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agents, exchange social cues with them and show a sense of commitment. 
The paper certainly raises or reminds the reader of numerous questions on 
status of artifi cial agents as members of society, assuming, of course, the 
reader agrees with the author’s conclusions.
Other articles in this fi rst section of the book that we have not yet men-
tioned are Creative AI: Music Composition Programs as an Extension of the 
Composer’s Mind (Moruzzi), Artifi cial Brains and Hybrid Minds (Schweiz-
er), and Huge, but Unnoticed, Gaps Between Current AI and Natural Intel-
ligence (Sloman). An article that especially deserves a separate mention is 
René Mogensen’s Dynamic Concept Spaces in Computational Creativity for 
Music, which has, however, unfortunately proved to be too complex to sepa-
rately describe in this short review.
Moving to the second section of the book, we pay some extra attention 
to Shlomo Danziger’s Where Intelligence Lies: Externalist and Sociolinguis-
tic Perspectives on the Turing Test and AI. This paper reinterprets Alan 
Turing’s Imitation Game as a test which also includes the socio-linguistic 
dimension of how an agent is perceived by the society, focusing on human 
prejudice and our anthropocentric tendencies, which may present an ob-
stacle in objectively evaluating artifi cial agents’ intelligence. With this, the 
paper presents a rarely seen point-of-view towards human-AI relations, 
and, as the author concludes, teaches us ‘quite a bit about human intel-
ligence as well’.
Will Machine Learning Yield Machine Intelligence? by Carlos Zednik, 
published as the last article in the second section, considers how Explain-
able AIs might be able to solve the Black Box Problem, and what that means 
for the prospect of machine intelligence, concluding, after a short but con-
cise analysis, that the answer to the question in title may well be affi rma-
tive, iff we acknowledge algorithmic similarity of AI and humans to be a 
suffi cient criterion for machine intelligence.
Other articles in this section that merit a special mention are Support-
ing Pluralism by Artifi cial Intelligence: Conceptualizing Epistemic Dis-
agreements as Digital Artefacts (Human et al.), and Yoshihiro Maruyama’s 
paper Quantum Pancomputationalism and Statistical Data Science: From 
Symbolic to Statistical AI, and to Quantum AI.
Other articles in this section will, with all due respect to their authors, 
be omitted in this review to avoid the risk of ending up simply with an aug-
mented table of contents.
The third section contains contributions on numerous ethical issues that 
have been subject of recent debates in AI development, such as autonomous 
vehicles in Against Leben’s Rawlsian Collision Algorithm for Autonomous 
vehicles (Keeling), or less commonly discussed autonomous weapons in Au-
tonomous Weapons Systems – An Alleged Responsibility Gap (Swoboda).
AAAI: An Argument Against Artifi cial Intelligence by Sander Beckers 
considers perils development of conscious AI presents both for humanity 
and such AI itself, examining the probabilities of potential conscious AIs’ 
suffering, as well as risks a superintelligent AI could present to humans, 
concluding rather decisively that there should be an ethics-based ban on 
developing conscious artifi cial agents.
Another paper that caught additional attention is Abhishek Mishra’s 
Moral Status of Digital Agents: Acting Under Uncertainty, which considers, 
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rather than the moral status of AIs as artifi cial agents, the moral status 
of agents created within simulations of such AIs. Considering grounds for 
moral status of such agents and the Decision Problem that arises, the au-
thor points out the numerous additional questions raised in the process of 
attempting to solve the Decision Problem, creating an intriguing cue for 
future research and discussion on the subject.
Overall, the volume offers, also within articles I have omitted in this 
review, for which I again extend my apologies to their authors, numerous 
valuable contributions to already ongoing as well as new discussions taking 
place on the topic of AI Theory, making it a must-read for anyone working 
in AI-related fi elds, and an intriguing mental exercise for anyone simply 
interested.
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